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1

Introduction
Almost every product sold today must conform to standards, whether relating to

its design, manufacture, operation, testing, safety, sale or disposal, and sometimes to
many of these at once. At their root, standards are no more than written requirements or
design features of a product, service or other activity.1 They can be breathtakingly
detailed or disarmingly general, ranging from thousands of pages in length to just a few
sentences. Standards are set by a wide range of bodies, from governmental agencies to
industry consortia to multinational treaty organizations. Some standards are adopted into
local, state or federal legislation and attain the force of law, others remain voluntary, yet
are adopted by entire industries. This chapter provides a brief overview of the standards
development landscape as it pertains to climate change technologies, also sometimes
referred to as “clean tech”, “green tech” and sustainability technologies, as well as the
critical intellectual property issues that affect standards setting today.

2

Standards and Standard Setting: A Brief Overview
2.1

Types of Standards. Standards serve a variety of purposes and functions.

Below is a brief description of the types of standards prevalent today:
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2.1.1

Prophylactic. Prophylactic standards specify requirements

intended to protect public health and safety, to preserve the environment and to prevent
fraud and other abuses. These include most standards relating to food and drugs, air and
water quality, hazardous materials, construction, transportation, handling of personal
data, and the like. Prophylactic standards such as emissions limitations are frequently
associated with climate change technologies.
2.1.2

Quality. Related to prophylactic standards are more general

quality and performance standards. Compliance with these standards may signify the
achievement of a specified level of quality; for example, the cut, color, clarity and carat
ratings for diamonds and the Green Building Council’s LEED “green building”
certification.2 In some cases, quality standards may also be adopted to differentiate
among product variants in a consistent and uniform manner (e.g., whole, 2%, 1% and
skim milk). Professional accreditation societies such as the American Medical
Association (AMA), American Bar Association (ABA), and professional engineering
societies also adopt quality-based standards as conditions to professional licensure and/or
designations of specialization.
2.1.3

Informational. Some standards, such as automotive mileage (mpg

highway/city) ratings and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) nutritional labeling
requirements, provide a common format in which information must be provided to
consumers, regulators or others. They do not otherwise affect the products that they
describe.
2.1.4

Interoperability. Interoperability or compatibility standards

specify design features that enable products and services offered by different vendors to
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work together. Electrical outlets, for example, share a common design in the United
States that enables any appliance to be plugged into any outlet anywhere in the country
(though, as any frequent traveler knows, these standards vary dramatically from country
to country). More complex, but equally illustrative, are the numerous networking (USB,
Ethernet, WiFi), Internet (TCP, HTML, WWW), telecommunications (CDMA, GSM)
and digital media (CD, DVD) standards that enable devices manufactured by different
vendors to interact with one another in a manner that is largely invisible to the consumer.
2.2

Mandatory and Voluntary Standards. At the highest level of generality,

standards may be categorized as either mandatory, meaning that compliance is required
by an external body such as a governmental agency or a professional accreditation
organization, or voluntary, meaning that compliance is not required, though it may be
prudent or even necessary from a commercial standpoint. Thus, a cap on airborne
pollutants imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would be mandatory,
whereas a set of industry guidelines recommending such caps would be voluntary.
2.2.1

Mandatory Standards. In exercising their responsibility to ensure

the health and welfare of their citizens, governments typically adopt standards that are
prophylactic or informational. Such standards may arise due to a perceived public need
for regulation, often occurring in the aftermath of a highly-publicized incident or a new
study demonstrating the harmful effects of a substance, or as a result of petitioning by
private parties.3
Governmental standards may be developed either by technical experts working
within governmental agencies or by non-governmental groups (such as those described in
Section 2.2.2 below). Local and state governments seldom possess the technical skill or
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staff to develop their own standards, and generally adopt standards developed by industry
associations (examples being local building, electrical and plumbing codes and the
vehicle emissions standards adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB)4).
In February 2011, a biodiesel producer in New Mexico sought to enjoin ASTM from
adopting a standard specification for triglyceride burner fuel that would cap the allowable
amount of biodiesel blended with petroleum-based diesel fuel at five percent.5 The
biodiesel producer argued that adoption of the standard would exclude it from the
relevant market because the standard would become the law by reference in over thirty
states, but the court denied the request for injunction due to the lack of imminent harm.6
The court ultimately dismissed all of the biodiesel producer’s claims, holding that the
producer failed to allege a plausible antitrust violation because it could compete in the
relevant market despite the adoption of the standard.7
Many federal agencies, too, adopt privately-developed standards both for the sake
of expediency and because the relevant technical data is often in the hands of industry.8
The Federal Office of Management of Budget’s (OMB) guidelines for Federal agencies
require that agencies adopt suitable “voluntary consensus standards” in their procurement
and regulatory activities except to the extent “inconsistent with law or otherwise
impractical”.9 At an international level, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Uruguay
Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade requires that if recognized international
standards exist with respect to a technical area, national governments developing
standards in that area must adopt such international standards as the basis for their own
national standards.10
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When warranted, large U.S. federal agencies such as the EPA, FDA and NIST
may employ internal technical experts to develop standards, test products and investigate
incidents of non-compliance. These agencies operate under the general “notice and
comment” rulemaking procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)11
and, though they work independently, rely heavily on technical input and expertise from
industry and consumer groups.12 Multiple rounds of “negotiation” with industry
representatives typically occur before any significant standard is adopted, and even after
adoption federally-mandated standards are subject to challenge under the APA and to
revocation if found to be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.13
2.2.2

Voluntary Standards. Organizations that develop voluntary

standards are referred to generally as standards-development organizations (SDOs).
SDOs vary greatly in size and composition. Some, which are sometimes referred to as
consortia or “special interest groups” (SIGs),14 may consist of just a few companies that
collaborate on a narrow set of technical specifications, sometimes for a single product.
Standards for consumer electronics devices and media such as the DVD disc and player
were developed in this manner. Other SDOs are very large and encompass many
different standardization activities at any given time. ASTM International, for example,
is one of the largest SDOs and regularly develops standards in areas as diverse as
electrical wiring, playground equipment, composite materials, unmanned aircraft and
nanotechnology.15 Voluntary standards, particularly those in fields such as computing,
telecommunications and networking, are typically interoperability standards, though
SDOs may also adopt quality, informational and prophylactic standards.
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The work of individual SDOs is sometimes coordinated at the national and
international levels. In the United States, the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI)16 accredits more than 200 different SDOs and establishes basic policies and
criteria (“Essential Requirements”) for its members. The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO)17 is a Geneva-based non-governmental organization (NGO) whose
members constitute 163 national standards institutes from across the globe. ISO both
coordinates standards-development activities among its members and develops its own
consensus standards through numerous committees. Among its many projects, ISO has
developed voluntary best practices for greenhouse gas quantification and reporting.18
2.3

Standards Conformity and Assessment. Once a standard is adopted and

released, determining whether a product or service conforms with the standard may
require sampling, testing, inspection, analysis and other activity.19 In the case of purely
voluntary standards, such as those relating to product interoperability, the marketplace
may provide a sufficient test of conformity. That is, products that do not conform fully to
an interoperability standard may not work as intended, and may thus not satisfy consumer
demands. More formal means of conformity assessment are required, however, with
voluntary certification programs such as the Energy Star efficiency label (discussed in
Section 3.5 below) and the LEED green building certification (discussed in Section 3.7
below), each of which permit application of the relevant designation based on selfcertification by the program participant.
Conformity with governmental and other mandatory standards is typically a
matter of legal compliance and can be monitored internally, subject to periodic regulatory
inspection, or through more formal standards conformity assessments. In some areas,
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third party organizations have evolved to measure and certify compliance with both
mandatory and voluntary standards. Underwriters Laboratories (UL), for example, serves
as an independent product certification body for both governmental and nongovernmental standards, including clean energy technologies such as photovoltaics and
wind turbines.20 NIST and other governmental agencies also provide conformity
assessment services, and in areas such as eco-labeling and climate change, a plethora of
private third party certifying groups has arisen.21 The growing role of third party
certifiers has been viewed by some commentators with concern, as there is little oversight
or regulation of such third party certifiers, making it difficult to detect and prevent
potential bias and lack of competence.22

3

Standards and Climate Change
Below is a brief summary of the current standardization landscape for climate

change technology in the United States.
3.1

Emissions. In the United States, atmospheric emissions, whether by motor

vehicles, aircraft or stationary sources such as factories and power plants, are regulated
by the EPA under the Clean Air Act.23 EPA’s prophylactic clean air standards have
traditionally sought to reduce airborne carcinogens and other toxic air pollutants, to
reduce acid rain and to protect the ozone layer.24 Recently, however, the EPA has sought
to address climate change by establishing permitting standards for greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources.25 In conjunction with the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
EPA also recently adopted new greenhouse gas emission standards for passenger vehicles
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and light trucks.26 While the United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol on
greenhouse gas reduction27, the EPA’s recent activity would, for the first time, implement
Kyoto-style greenhouse gas reduction standards into U.S. regulation. The EPA’s effort in
this regard has been subject to a recent (and unsuccessful) legislative challenge claiming
that Kyoto-style emissions controls could “kill jobs and increase costs.”28
Organizations besides the EPA have also begun to develop emissions standards.
ASTM has established a voluntary standard that provides basic options for greenhouse
gas management strategies for unregulated small entities that want to prepare for
increased regulation.29 ISO has also developed a standard intended to quantify, monitor,
and report greenhouse gas emissions.30 President Obama has also issued an Executive
Order mandating that Federal Agencies become implement greenhouse gas emissions
management requirements to reduce their emissions from direct and indirect activities.31
Likewise, the European Union has set a goal of reducing emissions to 80-95% below
1990 levels by 2050.32
3.2

Fuel Efficiency. Vehicle fuel efficiency in the U.S. is regulated by the

EPA and NHTSA as well as state agencies. In April 2010, the EPA and NHTSA jointly
issued aggressive new fuel economy requirements for passenger cars and light trucks in
conjunction with the greenhouse gas standards noted in Section 3.1 above.33 These
requirements mandate the achievement of fleet-wide fuel economy ratings of 34.1 mpg
by model year 2016. In July 2011, the Obama Administration announced the next phase
in the program to increase fuel efficiency for all new cars and trucks sold in the United
States, which would require a fleet-wide fuel economy rating of 54.5 mpg by model year
2025.34 Fuel efficiency standards are prophylactic in a dual sense. First, like vehicle
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emissions standards, fuel efficiency standards are intended to address environmental
concerns by reducing fuel-based emissions and by decreasing the use of fossil fuels. In
addition, fuel efficiency standards are intended to provide consumer cost savings, a
predominant political rationale for the enactment of such standards.35
3.3

Biofuels. Biofuels include a broad range of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels

derived from plant and animal sources. Biofuels are seen by proponents as long-term
replacements for petroleum-based fossil fuels. To-date, only bioethanol and biodiesel
fuels are commercially traded or used on a wide scale and are produced primarily by the
United States, the European Union and Brazil.36 In the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Congress mandated minimum levels of renewable fuels
(including biofuels) that must be used for transportation purposes.37
Standardization activities relating to biofuels cover diverse aspects of the
production and distribution cycle and have been conducted by a variety of national and
industry SDOs including ASTM International (fuel specifications), the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (pipeline transmission, storage tanks), the American
Petroleum Institute (storage and distribution), Underwriters’ Laboratories (UL)
(dispensing devices) and SAE International (vehicular fuel systems).38 ANSI has
recently sought to coordinate international standardization efforts around biofuels
through its Biofuels Standards Coordination Panel.39
3.4

Renewable Energy Sources. Renewable energy comprises a diverse array

of non-depletable energy sources including wind, solar, geothermal, hydroelectric,
hydrogen, tidal and biomass. In 2008 the European Union adopted its Renewable Energy
Directive, which mandates that by 2020 at least 20% of all energy use, and 10% of
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transportation energy use, be derived from renewable sources.40 Though the United
States has not adopted comparable legislation at the federal level, a majority of U.S.
states have enacted renewable or alternative energy targets.41 From a technical
standpoint, standardization activity for renewable energy sources is carried out across a
wide spectrum of SDOs, consortia and working groups each focusing on a specific
technology or practice. ISO, for example, has initiated separate working groups focused
on solar energy, hydrogen technologies, wind turbines and bioenergy.42
3.5

Energy Efficiency. The widely-recognized “Energy Star” certification is a

voluntary labeling program sponsored by the EPA and the Department of Energy (DOE)
that is intended to promote energy-efficient household products, appliances, and
buildings.43 EPA standards in 60 different product categories dictate when manufacturers
may apply the Energy Star label to a product. Though the Energy Star program is
voluntary, it has achieved mandatory status in certain cases, for example, through federal
regulations requiring that all lighting products in federal buildings be Energy Star
compliant.44 In general, however, Energy Star guidelines are more stringent than
mandatory federal efficiency standards which have been set for products such as light
bulbs, dishwashers, dehumidifiers, refrigerators and clothes washers.45 Moreover, though
definitions of “energy efficiency” vary, many states have also adopted energy efficiency
targets and standards directed primarily toward power generators.46
3.6

Smart Grid. The “smart grid” refers to a next-generation, distributed

national power grid that when implemented will enable two-way communication and
power transmission between generators, consumers and intermediate points.47 It is hoped
that implementation of the smart grid will dramatically improve the efficiency of power
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generation and consumption in the United States.48 Under EISA, NIST is directed to
coordinate the development of a new interoperability framework for the smart grid.49 In
2010 NIST announced the first 75 standards in this framework, covering technologies
ranging from electricity storage to utility metering to cyber security.50 These standards
were selected from existing specifications and standards developed by NIST itself as well
as other governmental agencies (e.g., Department of Homeland Security), international
bodies (e.g., the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International
Telecommunications Union (ITU)), ANSI-accredited SDOs (e.g., IEEE and the National
Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)), and private consortia (e.g., HomePlug
Powerline Alliance and the Zigbee Alliance).
Since 2010, NIST has continued developing an interoperability framework for the
smart grid. In July 2011, NIST added the first six standards to the SGIP Catalog of
Standards covering technologies such as internet protocols, energy usage information,
electric vehicle plugs, and upgrading household electric meters to smart meters.51 In
October 2011, NIST released a draft of version 2.0 of its interoperability framework for
the smart grid, which added twenty standards to the framework to help fill gaps identified
in version 1.0.52 Additionally, NIST and the Smart Grid Co-Ordination Group of the
European Union jointly published a white paper expressing their intent to collaborate to
ensure a consistent set of smart grid standards.53 Among the many challenges that will
face implementers of Smart Grid products will be understanding and complying with the
many different SDO rules and policies associated with this wide assortment of standards.
(See Section 4.3 regarding patent policies.)
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3.7

Building Sustainability. Residential and commercial buildings consume

significant quantities of energy and otherwise impact the environment in terms of their
construction, materials and ongoing cooling, heating, lighting and operations.54
Accordingly, significant attention has recently been paid to standards and specifications
for “green” and “sustainable” buildings,55 and there has been a proliferation of standards
relating to sustainability.56 Among the most widely-recognized of such standards is the
LEED building certification system administered by the U.S. Green Building Council,
which rates buildings based, among other things, on siting, water efficiency, energy
conservation, materials and indoor environmental quality.57 In 2009 the International
Code Council (ICC), working together with the American Institute of Architects (AIA)
and ASTM International, released a model International Green Construction Code
(IGCC) specifying minimum standards for commercial buildings in areas such as energy
efficiency, water use, carbon footprint, building maintenance and waste management.58
When published in final form (expected in 2012), the IGCC will be available for adoption
by jurisdictions on a mandatory basis.59 Despite the proliferation of standards relating to
building sustainability, materials sustainability standards lack a consistent vocabulary, as
well as a consistent and transparent means for measuring and testing sustainability
criteria.60 These issues make sustainability standards difficult to compare in a
meaningful way, which is further complicated by the fact that many standards purport to
certify the same, or very similar, product characteristics.61
3.8

Electric Vehicles. Electric vehicles provide great potential for reducing

fuel-based emissions and dependence on foreign fuel sources. Accordingly, ANSI has
created the Electric Vehicles Standards Panel (EVSP) to foster coordination and
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collaboration among stakeholders in order to develop standards for electric vehicle
technologies and infrastructure.62 The EVSP plans to produce a strategic roadmap of the
standards and conformity assessment programs that are necessary for the widespread
acceptance and deployment of electric vehicles.63 The EVSP has identified the need
working groups to focus on standards in areas ranging from energy storage systems and
vehicle components to charging systems and infrastructure user interface.64
4

Intellectual Property and Standards
Standards often implicate and are affected by intellectual property. Indeed,

standards themselves may specify patentable inventions, and the written embodiments of
standards are generally protectable by copyright. Furthermore, the more complicated the
technology is that a standard specifies, the more likely the standard is to implicate patents
owned by members of the SDO or by third parties. SDOs and implementers of technical
standards are therefore likely to encounter numerous intellectual property issues outlined
in this section.
4.1

Copyright in Standards. Technical standards typically take the form of

written descriptions of how products or services should be designed, built or operated.
As written documents, standards are typically protected by copyright, meaning that they
cannot be reproduced, displayed or modified without permission of the copyright owner
(often the SDO). Many SDOs earn significant revenue from the sale of standards (some
of which extend to hundreds of pages) and warn against illegal copying and
distribution,65 though a number of major SDOs allow their standards to be downloaded
and copied without charge.66 The tension between copyright protection of standards and
the social utility of standards becomes particularly clear when a proprietary standard is
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adopted and referenced by a governmental agency and thereby becomes “the law”.67 Use
of a copyrighted standard may become mandatory by statute or regulation, yet access to
that standard can be controlled by the SDO that owns the copyright.
Such a situation developed when the federal Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA)68 required the use of the Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT)69 standard for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims.70 The copyright on
this standard was owned by the American Medical Association (AMA), which granted
the HCFA “a non-exclusive, royalty free, and irrevocable license to use, copy, publish
and distribute” the standard.71 In Practice Management Information Corp. v. American
Medical Ass'n., Practice Management Information Corp., desiring to publish the CPT
standard, sought a declaratory judgement that the AMA no longer possessed a valid
copyright on the CPT after the HCFA mandated use of the CPT standard.72 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to hold the AMA’s copyright invalid and
affirmed that the AMA may control the copyrighted text of the CPT standard, even as
adopted into law.73 This approach is consistent with the OMB’s guidance to Federal
agencies, which states that agencies adopting voluntary consensus standards “must
observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder.”74
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has taken a different
approach to this issue. In Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress Intl.,75 Peter Veeck,
the operator of a non-profit web site, posted the local building codes of two Texas
municipalities. The municipal codes were taken verbatim from Southern Building Code
Congress International’s (SBCCI) published Standard Building Code. When Veeck
published the codes on his web site, SBCCI sued for infringement of its copyrights. The
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en banc Fifth Circuit, relying on precedent that copyright cannot prevent the reproduction
and distribution of “the law”, held that while SBCCI retains copyright in its model codes,
once they are enacted into law, they may be reproduced and distributed freely.76
Important to the court’s reasoning was the fact that SBCCI’s model codes were
developed specifically to be adopted by municipalities into their local building codes.
The court distinguished this case from one in which a governmental agency simply
incorporates an extrinsic standard into its regulations by reference, noting precedent in at
least two other circuits holding in favor of the SDOs in such cases.77
SDOs often see the licensing of standards as revenue sources, and claim that the
development of standards requires copyright ownership as an incentive.78 Widespread
adoption of the standard, however, creates tension between society’s need for access to
the standard and the SDO’s financial interest in controlling reproduction of the standard.
4.2

Patenting and Standards.
4.2.1

Patents Covering Standardized Technology. As noted above,

standards are written descriptions of particular attributes of specified products and
services. A simple biofuel standard might specify, for example, that in order to be
certified as a “Type X” biofuel, a mixture must contain at least 80% ethanol and no less
than 3% of substance X. Assuming that statutory requirements of utility, novelty and
non-obviousness are overcome, a patent could be obtained on a biofuel that conforms
with this standard, or the methods of producing, storing or utilizing it. Such a patent
would ordinarily not be obtained by the SDO in which the standard was developed, as
SDOs seldom develop complete products and almost never seek to patent their work.
Rather, if such a patent were obtained, it would be obtained by a participant in the SDO
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or an outsider, and sometimes both. Two general patent-related issues thus arise in the
context of technology standardization; these are referred to as patent stacking and patent
ambush.
4.2.2

Patent Stacking and Patent Pools. Patent or royalty “stacking”,

also referred to as a patent “thicket” or anti-commons, is said to occur when multiple
entities each hold patents claiming aspects of a single standardized technology.79 In order
for a producer to implement the standardized technology in a product, it must obtain
licenses from multiple parties, each acting independently and each seeking to maximize
its gains. The risk of stacking is thus that the sum of individual royalty demands may be
excessive in relation to the overall value of the product, making the standardized product
uncompetitive in comparison to products that do not conform with the standard.
One method of addressing stacking concerns is through the creation of a patent
pool. In a patent pool, multiple patent owners contribute or license patents that are
essential to the implementation of the standard to a common agent (sometimes one of the
patent holders and sometimes a newly-formed entity). Licensees are charged a single
royalty to practice the entire group of patents, and net revenues are allocated among the
pool participants in accordance with a pre-determined formula. Such pools have been
used effectively in connection with consumer electronics standards such as the MPEG
audio compression format,80 the DVD video compression format81 and third generation
wireless communications standards.82 In each of these cases the U.S. Department of
Justice approved the proposed patent pool, provided that it possessed certain features that
are viewed to lessen potentially anticompetitive effects. For example, such pools must
contain only patents “essential” to the implementation of the standard (as the inclusion of
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patents on substitute technologies could lessen competition among technical alternatives),
licensees must have the freedom to obtain licenses to the patents independently from the
pool, licensing of the pooled patents must be conducted on a non-discriminatory basis,
and to the extent that the patent pool owners require licensees to “grant back” licenses to
them, such grantback licenses must only cover patents that are, themselves, essential to
implementation of the standard.83
It is important to note that the utility of a patent pool may be limited to the extent
that fewer than all holders of essential patents become members of the pool. Such a
situation arose recently with respect to the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC)
ATSC standard for digital television transmission. Though a patent pool comprising
many holders of patents essential to implementation of the mandatory ATSC standard
was formed, one patent holder, Japan’s Funai Electric Company, did not join the pool and
sought to charge royalties for a single patent at a rate equal to the rate charged by the
entire ATSC pool.84 When Funai sought to bar imports of televisions by Vizio, Inc., a
U.S. manufacturer that refused to pay this royalty, Vizio sought temporary relief from the
FCC. Though the matter was rendered moot when the Federal Circuit held that Vizio did
not infringe the asserted patent,85 the dispute highlights the fragility of patent pooling
arrangements that do not include all relevant patent holders.
4.2.3

Patent Ambush. The second major patent issue that arises in the

standards context is patent ambush, also known as “hold-up”, which occurs when a patent
holder seeks to assert a previously unidentified patent against implementers of a standard
after the standard has been adopted (either by an SDO or a governmental agency).86 If
patent hold-up occurs after the industry has devoted significant resources to production,
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marketing and training with respect to standardized products (in economic terms, after
the standard has become “locked-in”), unexpected royalty demands from patent holders
can have an extremely disruptive effect on the market, driving up the cost of standardized
products to levels that are inefficient and uncompetitive with alternative technologies.87
4.3

SDO Patent Policies.
4.3.1

Policy Measures to Address Patent Issues. Patent stacking and

ambush can arise in the context of either patents held by participants in the SDO or
patents held by non-participating third parties. The risk posed by SDO participants’
patents is perceived as particularly serious because, unlike non-participating third parties,
SDO participants can potentially shape the technical parameters of a standard toward
their own patent positions. In response, many SDOs have adopted formal policies that
attempt to address these issues by imposing one or both of the following obligations on
participants: (1) an obligation to disclose patents essential to implementation of a
standard, and/or (2) an obligation to license patents essential to implementation of a
standard, either on a royalty-free basis or on terms that are “reasonable and
nondiscriminatory.”88 Such obligations are intended to ensure that standards developers
have at their disposal sufficient information to assess the relative costs and risks of
technologies under consideration for standardization. That is, disclosure obligations
ensure that standards developers know whether and which patents cover technologies
under consideration, giving them the opportunity to “design around” patents if they so
wish, and licensing obligations ensure that such patents will be licensed on terms that are,
at least roughly, understood.89
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4.3.2

Disclosure Requirements and Their Violation. Despite the

adoption by many SDOs of policies requiring disclosure of patents essential to standards
under development, several highly-publicized instances have arisen in which SDO
participants have failed to make the required disclosures and then, after lock-in of the
standard, have sought to enforce their patents against other implementers of the standard.
The first of these cases to gain significant attention involved Dell Computer, which failed
to disclose patents relevant to the voluntary VL-bus industry standard developed in the
Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA).90 When Dell sought to enforce its
patents against other computer manufacturers following approval of the standard, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an action that resulted in the entry of a 1996
consent order permanently restricting Dell from enforcing those patents against any third
party. The Dell decision remains controversial, as there was no allegation that the Dell
representative knew of Dell’s pending patent or the potential for infringement at the time
the VL-bus standard was adopted.91 In response, SDO policies today often specify that
searches of corporate patent portfolios not be required to comply with SDO disclosure
requirements, or that disclosure be limited to the “knowledge” of an SDO participant’s
individual employees participating in standards development.92
The most notorious incidence of disclosure failure within an SDO involved the
semiconductor technology vendor Rambus, Inc. Volumes have been written about the
decade-long legal battles in which Rambus sought to assert various dynamic random
access memory (DRAM) patents against the entire DRAM industry after those
technologies had been standardized by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
(JEDEC), a voluntary SDO in which Rambus participated in the early 1990s.93
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Ultimately, Rambus was exonerated with respect to the allegations that it violated
JEDEC’s patent disclosure rules, primarily due to the vagueness of the rules themselves.
In one often-cited case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit criticized the
JEDEC policy as suffering from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left SDO
participants with “vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the policy
requires”.94 The court excused Rambus’s behavior on the basis that the poorly-crafted
JEDEC policy was simply too imprecise an instrument to support liability. It concluded
that, “while such actions impeach Rambus’s business ethics, the record does not contain
substantial evidence that Rambus breached its duty under the … policy.”95
In a subsequent action, the FTC found Rambus liable, among other things, for
attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and deceptive
conduct under Section 5 of the FTC Act.96 The FTC’s decision, however, was reversed
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held that Rambus’s attempt
to increase prices following adoption of a standard did not amount to anticompetitive
conduct unless such conduct also resulted in adoption of the standard, which was not
shown.97 This decision has been criticized, both on the basis of its antitrust analysis and
as a matter of public policy inasmuch as it seemingly condoned conduct that has been
widely condemned as deceptive.98
SDO disclosure rules are also relevant in the context of mandatory standards. In
the late 1980s, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) began to formulate
regulations and standards for reducing emissions from gasoline. Union Oil Company of
California (Unocal), together with other companies, actively participated in the agency’s
standard-setting proceedings. Shortly before the new CARB regulations went into effect
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in 1996, Unocal announced that it held patent rights necessary to practice the standard
and that it intended to collect royalties of $0.0575 per gallon of gasoline sold in
California.99 After an unsuccessful attempt by competitors to invalidate the asserted
patent, in 2003 the FTC brought an action against Unocal, charging it with attempted
monopolization and imposing unreasonable restraints on trade.100 The matter was
ultimately settled with Unocal’s agreement to cease all enforcement of the relevant
patents.101
4.3.3

Royalties for Standards-Essential Patents. Many SDOs require

that participants commit to license patents essential to their standards on terms that are
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). This requirement is built into ANSI’s “Essential
Requirements” for all ANSI-accredited SDOs102 and is equally pervasive in Europe and
other jurisdictions. Despite the intuitive appeal of these requirements, however, a
consistent and practical definition of F/RAND terms has proven to be notoriously
difficult to pin down. In several recent cases, parties have disputed whether the terms
under which licenses have been proffered violate or conform with F/RAND
requirements.103
F/RAND licensing commitments tend to fail because there is no universal,
objective standard by which “reasonableness” (or “nondiscrimination”) can be
measured.104 In order to make a F/RAND determination, the specific facts of each
situation must be evaluated. These facts include not only relevant market norms for
royalties, but also customary practices relating to non-royalty terms such as reciprocity,
grantback licenses, defensive suspension, confidentiality and the like. Also, given that a
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patent holder’s F/RAND licensing terms are generally not revealed until negotiations
occurring after a standard has been adopted (i.e., “locked-in”), parties involved in
standards setting can experience uncertainty regarding the ultimate cost of adopting a
standard encumbered by patents. Put another way, the uncertainty of F/RAND licensing
may simply substitute the risk of patent hold-up arising from unknown patents with holdup arising from unknown F/RAND licensing terms.105
4.3.4

Ex Ante Disclosure of License Terms. Several commentators have

suggested that permitting or requiring patent holders to disclose their royalty rates and
licensing terms to SDO participants prior to the adoption of a standard (i.e., “ex ante”)
would alleviate the F/RAND hold-up problems described above.106 Such advance
disclosure, it is argued, would enable SDO participants to evaluate the cost of including
particular patented technologies in a standard prior to adoption, and would thus enable
more efficient decision making with respect to the technical design of the standard.
Critics of ex ante disclosure, however, argue that ex ante disclosures in the
standards context present both practical and legal issues. The introduction of legal
licensing terms to the technical standards development process might cause the process to
become more cumbersome, lengthy and expensive.107 Concerns have also been raised
that allowing ex ante licensing negotiations could facilitate the improper exchange of
information among competitors and might place too much power in the hands of
licensees acting collectively. That is, potential implementers of a standard, in negotiating
ex ante license terms with a patent holder, could collectively exert anticompetitive
pressure on the patent holder, causing royalties to decrease below their fair (or optimal)
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level.108 Following this argument to its logical conclusion, group pressure could drive all
royalty rates toward zero, resulting in the devaluation of any patents covering a standard.
Despite these considerations, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has on two
recent occasions issued Business Review Letters approving limited ex ante disclosure
policies in SDOs. In the case of the VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA),
the DOJ indicated in 2006 that it would not take enforcement action against an SDO that
required participants to make ex ante declarations of the “most restrictive” licensing
terms in their RAND licenses. In approving the VITA policy, the DOJ concluded that ex
ante disclosure of restrictive licensing terms would promote, rather than hinder,
competition among patent holders.109 Likewise, in its 2007 Business Review Letter to
IEEE,110 the DOJ approved a proposed arrangement in which patent holders were given
the option to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms, including royalty rates, prior
to the adoption of a standard. The DOJ called the IEEE proposal “a sensible effort to
preserve competition between technological alternatives before the standard is set in
order to alleviate concern that commitments by patent holders to license on RAND terms
are not sufficient to avoid disputes …”.111 The European Commission has also expressed
a general level of comfort with ex ante licensing disclosures in a recently-released set of
guidelines relating to horizontal competition.112 It remains to be seen whether these
recent developments result in greater or lesser efficiency, transparency and fairness in the
standards development process. [An empirical study of the effects of ex ante disclosure
of licensing terms on IEEE, VITA and other SDOs is currently being undertaken by the
author with the support of NIST.]
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4.4

Trademarks and Certification Marks for Standards. As noted above,

numerous standards relating to climate change and sustainability permit the application of
a certification label (such as ENERGY STAR or the LEED “green building”
certification) to a product or service. Such “certification marks” may be registered by the
SDO with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in a manner similar to trademarks,
though they differ from trademarks in several important regards. Whereas trademarks
are used to indicate the origin of a product or service and thereby to assure its quality to
the consumer, certification marks are used to indicate compliance by a product or service
with a particular standard of quality, without regard to its origin.113 Certification marks
may be applied to goods or services by any organization adhering to the relevant
standard, but may not be applied by the mark’s owner.114 Moreover the holder of the
certification mark must allow any organization that complies with the standard to apply
the mark,115 essentially creating, as McCarthy has observed, a compulsory licensing
scheme for certification marks.116 Violation of the foregoing requirements can result in
cancellation of the certification mark.117
Margaret Chon has noted several weaknesses in current U.S. law governing
certification marks.118 In recent years, numerous certification marks purport to indicate
to consumers various characteristics about a product, such as compliance with an organic
farming or fair trade standard.119 However, in a global marketplace with widespread
supply chains, the consumer and competitors are largely unable to confirm compliance
with the standard represented by the certification mark.120 That task is left with the
certification mark owner, yet certification mark owners often collect revenue from the
use of the mark. This creates a conflict of interest in which the organization charged with
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ensuring that only complying products bear the mark is the same as that receiving
revenue from use of the mark.121 U.S. law lacks a robust system of oversight for
checking and monitoring compliance with standards represented by the certification
marks.122 This lack, combined with high levels of complexity and limited transparency
into the certification process lead to consumer ignorance and confusion over certification
marks, leaving little to deter unscrupulous and overzealous use of certification marks.123
To address this and other issues, Chon proposes various changes to the statutory
framework governing certification marks, including a requirement that greater
information about the standards underlying certification marks be disclosed by
registrants, an expansion of the doctrines of trademark “abandonment” and misuse to
certification marks, and the allowance of various consumer actions against both holders
of certification marks and entities applying those marks in the case of fraud, deceit and
false marking.124 It remains to be seen whether these suggestions gain traction within the
standards community or are taken up by legislators and consumer advocacy groups and
ultimately embodied in law.

5

Conclusion
Technical standards are likely to play an increasingly prominent role in the

development, adoption and regulation of technologies relating to climate change and
clean energy. And whether such standards relate to the chemical composition of new
biofuels, sustainability characteristics of new buildings or the exchange of data among
smart grid components, intellectual property rights will play a key role in determining
which of these standards are broadly adopted, and at what price.
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